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Inheritances and gifts: Possibilities for a fair taxation of 
 intergenerational capital transfers 
by Johannes Stößel, Julian Schneidereit and Sonja Stockburger
bstract: In Germany, transfers of assets between generations 
are subject to inheritance and gift tax.1 However, there 
are different views on whether or not the present level of 
taxation is high enough. Our study looks at the potential for 
applying increases. We show that the constitutional framework 
does indeed allow for higher taxation in the case of intergenera-
tional property transfers. We identify the essential points in current 
German inheritance and gift tax law, which make it possible to 
transfer large assets with no or low inheritance tax burden. For 
these points as well as the determination of tax rates, we pro-
pose  reform approaches and present options for the use of possible 
additional income.
Keywords: Inheritance and gift tax; Intergenerational property 
transfers; Fair taxation
Legitimacy and the necessity of reforming the taxation of 
 intergenerational capital transfers
Wealth transfers between generations can have implications for 
both intergenerational and intragenerational justice. Such trans-
fers may replicate or strengthen wealth inequalities and thus an 
unequal distribution of wealth may endure from one genera-
tion to the next. There are various positions as to whether such 
 unequal distribution of wealth is permissible (e.g. Osterloh-Kon-
rad 2017: 310-319; Rawls 1970; Dworkin 2000; Piketty 2020; 
Nozick 1974; Murphy/Nagel 2002). The possible effects of the 
unequal distribution of wealth, for example on health, political 
participation, social mobility, education, economic growth and 
social  cohesion (e.g. Stiglitz 2012; OECD 2015; Osterloh-Kon-
rad 2017: 310; WSI Distribution Monitor 2016: 19; Lampert 
et al. 2005: 7; Fratzscher 2016: 117 ff.; Öchsner 2016; Piketty 
2020: 1198; Cingano 2014; Murphy 2015: 615; Nagel 2009: 
117-118; Fratscher 2016: 91-92) can, in our view, be assessed as 
socially negative and unfair. Furthermore, we consider this to be 
a violation of equal opportunities, which are necessary within a 
well-functioning meritocracy. If this view is followed, the inter-
generational transfer of wealth offers one of many possible start-
ing points for using taxation to mitigate the prolonged unequal 
distribution of wealth and make a contribution to reallocation. 
This can be achieved by inheritance and gift tax. On the one 
hand, large assets may be reduced by tax at the time of trans-
fer. On the other hand, tax revenues in particular can be used to 
mitigate wealth inequality and social injustices or a resulting lack 
of equal opportunities. From the point of view of intergenera tio n - 
al justice, an increased inheritance tax could also be justified by 
helping to hold the national debt at a moderate level for future 
generations. We start by setting out the constitutional limits of an 
inheritance and gift tax burden in Germany. Based on this, the 
most important components of current inheritance and gift tax 
law that prevent effective or higher taxation are shown and reform 
approaches are proposed. 
If a view is taken that unequal distribution with its consequences 
has to be accepted, or if inheritance and gift tax is considered as 
the wrong starting point for a more comprehensive intervention 
(e.g. Birk 2005: 348; Eckhoff 2016: 224), then we consider there 
to be two reasonable options for the taxation of intergenerational 
asset transfers. Due to the high degree of complexity as well as 
regular constitutional criticism coupled with the relatively (very) 
low2 tax revenue, inheritance and gift tax should either be 
 abolis hed or, in the case of low tax rates, significantly simplified 
(as a proposal for this, see Kirchhof 2011: 582 ff.). 
Constitutional framework of inheritance and gift tax
General information
Any (tax) legislation is bound by the constitutional order 
(Article 20 (3), Basic Law). In this context, the German Basic 
Law (Grundgesetz/GG), which came into force on 23 May 1949, 
sets the benchmark and basis for the legality of parliamentary 
laws which have been adopted, hence forming the cornerstone 
and framework for all positive law. Accordingly, tax law science 
can to a large extent be regarded as constitutional law science 
(cf. Seer 2018: §1 Rz. 3). Whatever objectives are pursued in 
the context of tax policy decisions, the constitutional basis thus 
 always  remains the same and must inevitably be considered. 
If a reformed inheritance and gift tax system wants to accord with 
legal requirements, it is above all necessary to analyse judgements 
explicitly declaring the Erbschaftsteuer- und Schenkungsteuergesetz, 
or ErbStG (German inheritance and gift tax law), as unconsti-
tutional.3 Specifically, this must be done so as to fulfil demands 
made by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, or BVerfG (German Federal 
Constitutional Court), for an inheritance and gift tax law that 
conforms with the Basic Law. As described earlier, this is one of 
the highest premises of tax law science, since above all the basic 
rights (Article 1 to Article 19, Basic Law), which are provided 
with the so-called eternity clause, must be regarded as an insti-
tution of legislation which cannot become subject to reform. In 
addition to the judgements mentioned above, even though in-
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heritance and gift tax law has been featured in several decisions 
by the Federal Constitutional Court,4 it is nevertheless the three 
explicitly mentioned rulings (see endnote 3) that define consti-
tutional requirements and thus the scope for a new inheritance 
and gift tax system. Hence, in what follows these three relevant 
judgements (with corresponding references to further jurispru-
dence) are placed in a logical context so as to deduce the lines of 
argumentation developed by the constitutional judges. The aim 
here is to create the constitutional prerequisites for an inheritance 
and gift tax system that optimally bridges the gap between prin-
ciples that the authors believe to be decisive for inheritance and 
gift tax law within the framework set by the BVerfG. As men-
tioned earlier, these are: (1) the principle of taxation on the basis 
of ability-to-pay (derived from the principle of equality (Article 
3, Basic Law)); (2) the family principle (Article 6, Basic Law); (3) 
the protection of property and the right of inheritance (Article 
14, Basic Law); and (4) the welfare state principle (Article 20 (1), 
Basic Law).
Inheritance law and tax rate
Article 14, Basic Law provides a constitutional guarantee for the 
right to inherit. This principle, which is fundamental to inher-
itance law, also directly affects inheritance and gift tax law due to 
the fact that inheritance law is authoritative for inheritance and 
gift tax law. Article 14, Basic Law implies that it is possible to de-
duce from the right “to inherit something” that a complete “taxing 
away” of the inheritance cannot be permissible. The BVerfG itself 
deals with this Article exclusively in the first decisions from 1995 
mentioned above. However, it is only in an abstract formulation 
that the limit of tax access is where an “excessive burden” occurs 
and the “accrued assets would be fundamentally impaired”.5 This 
is followed by the concrete formulation that the “tax burden must 
not make the inheritance appear economically senseless from the 
point of view of an economically thinking owner.”6 This chain of 
unspecific formulations leaves things open as to where exactly a 
constitutional maximum limit for inheritance tax rates lies. 
Based on the considerations above, it can thus be concluded that 
no concrete limitation of the tax rate can be ascertained from 
Article 14, which explicitly concerns inheritance tax law, unless 
the inheritance is fully “taxed away”. This is also reflected in the 
jurisprudence. Thus, the BVerfG considered a tax burden of 62% 
not to be unconstitutional, just as the German Federal Court of 
Finance (BFH) did not consider a tax burden of almost 70% to 
have a “strangling” effect.7 If the inheritance tax burden is con-
sidered in isolation, this represents an incomplete recording. If, 
under the current system, a sale is made later than five years8 
 after the transfer date relevant for inheritance tax, this may pos-
sibly result in a (substantial) double burden of inheritance and 
income tax (Stahl 2011: §35b EStG Rz. 10). Thus, a reformed 
inheritance tax system must also take into account interdepen-
dencies between income tax and inheritance tax. In this respect, 
the Federal Court of Finance grants a certain leeway in regard to 
its rulings on the latter. For example, in a ruling of 17 February 
2010, the second senate9 considered a burden of 33% inheritance 
tax and subsequently 46% income tax to be “no confiscatory”10 
burden.11 Against the background of a maximum constitutional 
burden which is not explicitly specified, Articles 3, 6 and 20 of 
the Basic Law mentioned above are now becoming relevant when 
considering to what extent their partly conflicting and partly har-
monising principles can create a framework for a constitutional 
and universally acceptable inheritance tax system.
Justification and necessity for tax exemptions: Basic information
The basic principle of Germany’s tax system, taxation on the basis 
of ability to pay, is derived from Article 3 (1) of the Basic Law and 
can also readily be seen in the context of inheritance tax law. The 
only people to be taxed are those who actually have an increase in 
financial capacity through an inheritance or gifts. Moreover, this 
gain in financial capacity is taxed based on progressive tax rates.12
However, in addition to taxation according to financial capacity, 
fulfilling the principle of equality (Article 3, Basic Law) also re-
quires consideration being given to the general public and overall 
uniformity. Thus, tax has to be levied irrespective of characteristics 
such as origin, religion, profession and the like; furthermore, all 
economically identical circumstances have to be treated equally. 
Thus, the following question arises for an inheritance tax system: 
In line with the principle of equality, can favouring different catego-
ries of assets ((residential) real estate, cash assets, business assets, etc.) 
and transfers depending on family relationships to different extents be 
justified from a tax perspective? 
With this consideration it must be noted that questions regarding 
German valuation law, Bewertungsgesetz (BewG), which precedes 
the ErbStG, are excluded here. According to §9 BewG, common 
value is defined as the valuation principle. It is intended that 
this should reflect the value of common property as realistically 
as  possible across all economic assets, pursuant to the BVerfG 
 resolutions of 22 June 199513 and 7 November 2006.14 In our 
opinion, this can be considered reasonable, albeit a more consis-
tent implementation would be desirable here. 
In principle, Article 3 (1) of the Basic Law (commonly referred 
to as the principle of equality) requires that all persons have to be 
treated equally before the law. Thus, essentially equal things are to 
be treated equally and essentially unequal things are to be treated 
unequally. This applies to unequal burdens and unequal privile-
ges15 and in particular does not require that everyone should make 
an equal contribution to financing the community. Hence, while 
all citizens should be equally involved in financing the state’s 
tasks, it should strictly be in accordance with their ability to pay 
(principle of taxation on the basis of ability to pay).16
This principle of equal treatment is decisively overridden in 
 inheritance tax law if two situations exist: either it conflicts with 
This principle of equal treatment is decisively overridden 
in inheritance tax law if two situations exist: either it 
conflicts with another taxation principle established 
by the Basic Law; or the legislature wishes to promote 
or direct the behaviour of taxpayers for reasons of the 
common good. Here two decisive unequal treatments of 
the currently valid inheritance tax law can be identified: 
preferential treatment within the family; and preferen-
tial treatment for business assets.
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another taxation principle established by the Basic Law; or the 
legislature wishes to promote or direct the behaviour of tax- 
payers for reasons of the common good.17 Here two decisive 
 unequal treatments of the currently valid inheritance tax law can 
be identified: preferential treatment within the family; and pre f-
erential treatment for business assets. The latter are to be  favoured 
for reasons of the common good not only to create  value and 
employment, but also to preserve jobs.18 The necessity of these 
two restrictions in the principle of equality will now be assessed 
separately.
Protecting business assets
As discussed above, an unfair advantage for a category of assets 
can be justified only if it serves legitimate objectives. This raises 
two questions: what should the aim of inheritance tax be in this 
context, and does the objective pursued by current relief measures 
require such unequal treatment? 
In regard to the latter question, it can be taken as established case 
law in this context that small and medium-sized enterprises are 
considered worthy of protection as guarantors of German growth 
and prosperity. Hence, they and the jobs associated with them 
should not be endangered.19 In its 1995 judgement, the Federal 
Constitutional Court stated that the principle of equality already 
requires that the reduced (financial) capacity of heirs resulting 
from continuation of the business (as opposed to sale or aban-
donment) should be taken into account through a preferential 
treatment of business assets.20 In its judgement of 7 November 
2006, though, the Federal Constitutional Court then stated that 
any increase in (financial) capacity is measured by the (sales) 
price achievable under objective conditions21 and thus preferen-
tial treatment is not justified by the principle of equality alone. 
Accordingly, the reasoning inherent within these three rulings, 
namely that the assets of small and medium-sized enterprises 
should be favoured for reasons of public welfare, remains since a 
transfer to the next generation should not result in any loss of jobs 
and jeopardise the enterprise’s survival.22 Thus, it seems that more 
generous solutions for benefiting these companies should be cre-
ated/maintained. However, in our view protecting the continued 
existence of transferred enterprises can also be guaranteed in con-
nection with a lower level of preferential treatment for business 
assets than is currently the case (see ch. Benefiting business assets) 
and thus less discriminatory for the heirs of non-business assets.
In its most recent judgement from 2014, the BVerfG states that 
the legislature has set limits on benefits that are contrary to Basic 
Law, so much so that the purpose of this support is contrary to 
other statutory provisions.23 In this context, the question arises 
as to why the principle of the welfare state, laid down in Article 
20 (1) of the Basic Law, has to date not been given concrete con-
sideration in inheritance tax law and the BVerfG’s relevant case 
law (outside of a special vote).24 At best, it could only have an 
effect as a kind of “moderation norm” of tax law (Hey 2017: 20). 
This article, although it does not have “fundamental rights status” 
(Articles 1-19, Basic Law), together with Article 1 of the Basic 
Law, forms the core of the constitution declared to be unalterable 
by Article 79.3 of the Basic Law. That is why its provisions can 
also be described as the constitution’s normative core (Grzeszick 
2014: Article 20, Basic Law no. 3).25 Inheritance tax should, above 
all, also be an instrument for promoting equality of opportunity 
or some other requirement distributive justice. It should thus 
also be the objective of inheritance and gift tax as an instrument 
of the welfare state to prevent wealth in the possession of a few 
from growing disproportionately on the basis of (social) origin 
or personal ties alone, which is why an associated equalisation is 
the responsibility of politics.26 Beneficial treatments for corporate 
assets implemented by the legislator for reasons of the common 
good should therefore have its limits at least where another prin-
ciple of the Basic Law triggers its scope. Insofar as the continued 
existence of a company and in particular its jobs can be secured, 
we believe that inheritance tax should above all be understood as 
an instrument of redistribution in order to do justice not only to 
the principle of equal treatment (Article 3 (1), Basic Law) but also 
the principle of a welfare state (Article 20 (1), Basic Law).
Beneficiary transfer to family members
From a constitutional perspective stemming from Article 3 (1) of 
the Basic Law, taxation based exclusively on (financial) capacity is 
the key premise. The legislature’s ability to implement an inher-
itance tax privilege for family members (lower tax rates; higher 
 allowances) in the ErbStG is due to Article 6 which competes with 
Article 3 (Piltz 2018: 172). Provision in the former, which has the 
same rank as the latter, selectively overrides the principle of taxation 
on the basis of ability to pay and considers the protection of mar-
riage and family as regulating the tax burden level.27 In this context, 
the Federal Constitutional Court demanded in its judgement of 
1995 that “The access to family members within the meaning of 
tax class I28 (§15 (1) ErbStG) for inheritance tax purposes [...] must 
be moderated in such a way that each of these taxpayers benefits 
from the estate transferred to him or her – depending on its size – at 
least to a clearly predominant extent or, in the case of smaller assets, 
completely tax-free.”29 The BVerfG also requires “that inheritance 
for the spouse still remains the result of the marital acquisition part-
nership and that also a co-entitlement for the children to the family 
property, as laid down in inheritance law, is not lost.”30 Otherwise, 
the BVerfG’s above-mentioned judgements make no reference to 
the family principle, which is why these unspecific formulations 
require interpretation by constitutional judges. 
The special position of spouses (registered civil partners), children 
and other family members, whose existence is understood in the 
literature,31 based on Article 6 (1) of the Basic Law, has a far-reach-
ing legal tradition in German inheritance (tax) law.32 Present dif-
ferentiation of tax rates and allowances depending on the family 
closeness of a testator/donor is based on the above-mentioned 
BVerfG ruling of 1995.33 In this context, the decisive question 
thus arises as to what constitutes a “clearly predominant” part of 
the estate. This depends to a large extent on the choice of scale. 
If a clearly predominant part of each estate (irrespective of its 
amount) has to be passed on, is this considered from a macroeco-
nomic point of view, so that a clearly predominant part of the sum 
of (all) estates is affected, or is this to be considered from the point 
of view of an “average heir”? The latter would mean that the “aver-
age” inherited assets within “the family” can be transferred to the 
next generation largely tax-free (see also ch. Personal allowances).
We believe that inheritance tax should above all be 
understood as an instrument of redistribution in order 
to do justice not only to the principle of equal treatment 
(Article 3 (1), Basic Law) but also the principle of a welfare 




In addition to the Articles referenced in this section, Article 6 (1) 
of the Basic Law can also be taken into prior consideration with 
regard to tax exemptions (currently regulated in §§13 ff. ErbStG). 
Thus, concerning the transfer of assets within the family, constitu-
tional conformity can be conclusively assessed only as a combina-
tion of tax exemptions (e.g. for family homes, transferred house-
hold effects and other objects), personal allowances and tax rates.
Constitutional conclusion
In summary, it can be stated that BVerfG case law provides more 
or less concrete framework conditions for an inheritance tax 
system. To date, these have comprised: formulating the princi-
ple of taxation on the basis of ability to pay (Article 3 (1), Basic 
Law), together with protecting marriage and family (Article 6, 
Basic Law) as well as the right to property (Article 14, Basic Law). 
However, in our view an inheritance tax system should above all 
take account of the welfare state principle contained in Article 20 
(1) of the Basic Law, which places the legislature under an obli-
gation to ensure that social differences are balanced out and thus 
a fair social order is provided.34 Inheritance tax should therefore 
be an instrument of the state, which is used to compensate for 
unequal opportunities in life, so that an increasingly unequal dis-
tribution of resources does not cause the opportunities for social 
and political participation to drift further apart.35 Inheritance tax 
should thus be used to counteract a consolidation of influence 
and power, irrespective of individual performance, and linked to 
“social origin”.36
Approaches to reforming the inheritance and gift tax system
General background
In Germany, norms from the Inheritance and Gift Tax Act (Erb-
StG) contribute in many ways to the current unequal distribution 
of wealth not having at least been reduced over time. In particular, 
tax exemptions have predominantly privileged the “richest” mem-
bers of society for generations (Beckert 2017: 27) and favour the 
concentration of wealth. The currently relatively minor social im-
portance of inheritance tax in Germany is also reflected in the low 
level of inheritance tax revenues (see endnote 2). Inheritance tax is 
currently not a steering mechanism, a redistributive function or a 
recognisable justice factor (Eckhoff 2016: 233; Tipke 2003: 875). 
Indeed, it has been noted that the current inheritance tax leads 
to “a mere sham taxation” (Hey 2017: 18). In order to achieve 
a real distribution of property, which would allow all citizens to 
participate in the wealth and could remedy possible negative con-
sequences of unequal wealth distribution, a higher inheritance tax 
burden for large properties could be one solution. 
The following reform approaches for the German inheritance tax 
system demonstrate ways of improving intergenerational and, in 
particular, intragenerational justice, while fulfilling the constitu-
tional framework set out in the chapter Constitutional framework 
of inheritance and gift tax. They will explain: which regulations 
in the current inheritance tax system make it possible to transfer 
assets to the next generation on a low or untaxed basis; to what 
extent these regulations could be changed; and ways in which 
 additional revenue could be used. It is not our intention here to 
propose one final reform of the inheritance tax law to solve all 
known problems. Likewise, our individual proposals are not to 
be regarded as conclusive. Certain details would still have to be 
worked out or empirically verified before implementation.
It should be borne in mind that inheritance and gift tax is only 
one part of an overall construct that has an impact on inter-
generational and intragenerational justice. Reform approaches are 
proposed which may be part of a system change with regard to the 
unequal distribution of wealth along with the resulting effects on 
intergenerational and intragenerational justice. Alongside adjust-
ments to the inheritance tax system specifically, this would require 
further changes to the current tax system as a whole,  together 
with further legal adjustments, which are not part of this study. 
In particular, it would also be necessary to consider maintaining 
and possibly even improving performance incentives. If a corre-
spondingly large intervention in the economic and tax system is 
undesirable or is judged impossible through inheritance tax (Eck-
hoff 2016: 224; Birk 2005: 348), then the reform approaches 
could also lead to less invasive interventions. The result is a frame 
that can be filled out according to political and social will. At the 
 appropriate points, reference is made to different options. 
In essence, our proposed reform approaches are based on the 
elimination or reduction of material and personal tax exemptions, 
to be replaced or enhanced by the introduction of a progressive 
tax rate depending on average assets held by an adult in Germany. 
This will ensure that high assets are taxed more heavily, in line 
with their value. A personal tax exemption – also dependent on 
the average assets – satisfies the constitutional protection of family 
and property and ensures that small and medium-sized assets can 
be transferred with a low inheritance tax burden or in many cases 
none at all.
Benefiting business assets
As the investigations on constitutional assessment in the previous 
chapter have already shown, one of the most controversial exemp-
tions from inheritance tax concerns business assets. The current 
Inheritance and Gift Tax Act provides for extensive tax exemption 
norms (possibly 100% tax exemption) for the transfer of business 
assets. If business assets are classified as eligible for preferential 
treatment (§13b (1) and (2) ErbStG) and not as administrative 
assets37 (§13b (3) and (4) ErbStG), an 85% exemption from 
 inheritance tax (§13a (1) ErbStG) is possible up to a business asset 
value of 26 million euros. This exemption is dependent on wage 
bill development (§13a (3) ErbStG) and a five-year retention 
The special position of spouses (registered civil partners), 
children and other family members based on Article 6 
(1) of the Basic Law, has a far-reaching legal tradition in 
German inheritance (tax) law. 
In Germany, norms from the Inheritance and Gift Tax Act 
(ErbStG) contribute in many ways to the current unequal 
distribution of wealth not having at least been reduced 
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generations.
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on the elimination or reduction of material and personal 
tax exemptions, to be replaced or enhanced by the intro-
duction of a progressive tax rate depending on average 




 period (§13a (6) ErbStG). If the administrative assets amount to 
less than 20% of total assets, then a 100% tax exemption is pos-
sible upon application (§13a (10) ErbStG). Between 26 million 
euros and 90 million euros, the tax exemption is reduced (§13c 
ErbStG). A ten-year period is considered for calculation of the 26 
million euro limit. This makes it possible to transfer companies or 
shares in a company tax-free, even if they are worth a multiple of 
26 million euros, as long as there are always more than ten years 
between the individual transfers. 
There are no other original exemption standards for business 
 assets. Under §28a of the German Inheritance and Gift Tax Act 
(ErbStG), though, testing for exemption qualification in the case 
of business asset transfers valued at greater than 26 million  euros 
can be carried out upon application. In this case, inheritance 
tax is waived on two conditions: the wage bill will be developed 
(§28a (4) sentence 1 no. 1 ErbStG); and there will be a seven-year 
 retention period (§28a (4) no. 2 ErbStG). This is possible if the 
inheritance tax is not covered within ten years by half of the heir’s 
assets which are not classified as beneficiary business assets (§13b 
(1) and (2) ErbStG) (§28a (2) and (4) no. 3 ErbStG). As a result, 
it is possible to minimise the inheritance tax burden very signifi-
cantly by appropriate tax or asset transfer planning.
Business assets are predominantly owned by the richest 10% of 
the population and, for example, achieved the highest increase 
in value in 2017 compared with other asset components (Dao et 
al. 2019: 8, 21; Grabka/Halbmeier 2019: 742 f.). From this, it 
can be concluded that privileges for business assets make a major 
contribution to the unequal distribution of wealth.
The tax legislator’s justification for preferential treatment is based 
on the avoidance of difficulties, particularly for small and me-
dium-sized enterprises, in being exposed to the risk of liquidity 
problems due to high inheritance tax claims. Continuation of 
these businesses and the jobs created by them should not be 
jeopardised,38 albeit whilst the fear is understandable there is no 
 empirical evidence that the existence of companies is threatened 
by inheritance tax (scientific advisory board at the Federal Min-
istry of Finance 2012: 30). Hannes/Holtz also state that it is not 
an unobjectionable step to assign a special role to business assets 
in the inheritance and to give them tax privileges over other assets 
(2018: §28 ErbStG Rz. 1; also as a result, e.g. Birk 2005: 349 ff.). 
In our opinion, this line should be followed. A comprehensive 
preferential treatment of business assets can lead to a distribution 
of wealth that is not fair from a generational perspective. 
Whilst we are concentrating here on German inheritance and 
gift tax law, a brief look at the equivalent laws in other Euro-
pean countries shows that business asset exemptions are not just 
a German phenomenon. For instance, a study by the auditing 
company PWC from 2015 should be noted, which clearly shows 
that many West European countries have specific tax facilities 
for business succession which include substantial allowances (de 
Lange-Snijders et al. 2015). 
Possible approaches for reform
Accordingly, the question arises as to how much preferential 
treatment of business assets is necessary or which regulations are 
 required to ensure that inheritance tax does not jeopardise the 
continuation of businesses. After all, an inheritance tax which 
would tend to make businesses unviable after the death of the 
owner could be socially negative. This must be prevented and 
 furthermore constitutional law gives this order.39
It is questionable whether a business can be (successfully) con-
tinued only if its heir is exempted from inheritance tax. It is the 
business assets that must be protected and not the private wealth 
of heirs. Private assets can be used to pay the inheritance tax, if 
they are insufficient for this purpose. Deferral regulations could 
be used to ensure that the inheritance tax burden is bearable and 
does not have a negative impact on companies’ investments. 
Hence, under certain conditions the state should grant a deferral of 
 inheritance tax upon application. The payment of inheritance tax 
per se is possible for heirs of companies that have a positive value 
according to the income capitalisation approach, as future profits 
can be expected – albeit with risks. In our opinion, a lump-sum 
remission such as is currently provided for under §28a ErbStG 
 should therefore be rejected except in cases of hardship, or at least 
made subject to much stricter and more restrictive conditions.
A prerequisite for deferral should be a deferral requirement 
 assessment. This means that the acquiring person must prove that 
the inheritance tax cannot be paid from other available  assets. 
If the inheritance tax exceeds available assets, the excess must 
be  deferred upon application. Moreover, available assets must 
be clearly defined. For example, it might be possible for owner- 
occupied residential property or retirement provision contracts to 
be excluded and only a certain percentage of the other available 
assets to be taken into account. The deferral could be linked to 
reasonable conditions in terms of generational justice (e.g. job 
preservation, environmental protection, etc.).
In addition, an heir is always free to sell the company (or which-
ever share of it they inherit). As a supplement or alternative aimed 
at reducing the strong unequal distribution of company assets, 
there are also pre-acquisition rights for employees.40 This would 
enable them to participate in their own company’s future increas-
es in value and profits. In addition, employees with a stake in the 
company should have more of an interest in its long-term success, 
as their personal financial gain is linked to the company’s success. 
Furthermore, a (partial) change of ownership could also be good 
If business assets are classified as eligible for preferential 
treatment, an 85% exemption from inheritance tax is 
possible up to a business asset value of 26 million euros. 
This exemption is dependent on wage bill development 
and a five-year retention period. 
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 understandable there is no empirical evidence that the 
 existence of companies is threatened by inheritance tax. 
Deferral regulations could be used to ensure that the 
inheritance tax burden is bearable and does not have 
a negative impact on companies’ investments. Hence, 
 under certain conditions the state should grant a 




for new entrepreneurial input. In addition, there is no apparent 
evidence supporting an idea that the best alternative for conti-
nuing a business is always to pass it on exclusively to the next 
generation of the family (Birk 2005: 349; Tipke 2003: 902; 
Houben/Maiterth 2009: C5; Mill 1852: 373). Companies can 
also break up due to family disputes and/or the incompetence of 
family successors (for this also: Tölle 2020: 10). Empirical studies 
even argue against favouring family-run or heir-run companies.41 
Furthermore, extensive preferential treatment in conjunction 
with retention periods create economic pressure on an heir not to 
sell, but continue the business regardless of any prevailing circum-
stances. However, in the long term this might even work against 
the goal of preserving jobs.
In regard to the creation and implementation of a system for the 
protection of business assets, it is also important to consider that 
any compulsion to limit and dispose of assets resulting from a 
restrictive (higher) inheritance or gift tax burden can create niches 
and opportunities for young entrepreneurs (Hannes/Holtz 2018: 
§28 ErbStG Rz. 1). If, for example, this were to be accompanied 
by additional (income) tax relief on company profits, it could 
serve as motivation and thus a catalyst for such entrepreneurs.
If preferential treatment for business assets is desired or, for 
 example, is deemed necessary in connection with possible high 
tax rates in order not to jeopardise continuation of the business, 
inheritance tax should be used for (generationally equitable) 
 steering purposes. Thus, in addition to the current qualifi cations 
for tax benefits (preservation of jobs, company size), further 
 conditions could be applied for economic reasons or issues to 
do with  generational equity (e.g. closing the digitalisation gap; 
minimising CO2 emissions; ecologically sustainable production). 
However, high planning and monitoring costs for both the state 
and the company must also be taken into account.
The question of how much protection should be provided for the 
continuation of businesses depends essentially on the basic levels 
of tax rates (see ch. Tax rates) and must be chosen accordingly. If 
necessary, different preferential treatment or deferral options must 
be determined depending on the size of an enterprise in order to 
honour the greater need for protecting small and medium-sized 
enterprises as comprising an established constitutional require-
ment (see ch. General information, Protecting business assets). Here, 
valid studies must also be prepared which show the possible bur-
dens relating to tax rates and their consequences together with 
the effectiveness and feasibility of protection measures mentioned 
here. In this context, consideration may also need to be given to 
any adjustments which could be considered necessary in coor-
dination with income tax positions (currently §35 EStG) in order 
to avoid unwanted double taxation. 
A moral approach to the higher taxation of company assets
One specific point should be taken into consideration when 
transferring businesses to the next generation. Heirs to businesses 
inherit not only property but also power in the form of authority 
(Locke 1691: §91 ff.). Although this issue can also arise with  other 
types of assets, it seems most pressing in the context of  business 
transfers, albeit largely to do with businesses of a certain size. 
Here, a certain distinction must be drawn from a moral perspec-
tive, in that goods and power need to be differentiated (Locke 
1691: §91 ff.). There is no moral right to transfer so-called rule 
or dominion (Locke 1691: §93 ff). The right to inherit property 
does not automatically give rise to the right to inherit  power 
(Locke 1691: §97 ff.). There is no reason from which it can be 
 deduced that power should be hereditary (Locke 1691: §93 ff.; 
§123 f.). In addition, there is no such right derived from the 
 German Basic Law. 
Furthermore, the question is prompted from macroeconomic and 
social points of view as to whether or not it is morally or legally 
legitimate to pass on companies from generation to generation 
within a family. For this to happen, the condition would have to 
be met that an heir possesses not only the entrepreneurial skills 
but also the ability to deal sensibly with this inherited power 
(Locke 1691: §123 f.). If these skills are available in the family, 
it would at least seem reasonable to conclude that the heir has 
learned what is required from previous generations. However, at 
the same time it must not necessarily be assumed that an heir is 
the best candidate or at least one of the best to hold any power 
associated with the company.
Summarising, there are significant arguments which speak against 
the inheriting of companies, or at least those businesses which are 
large enough to give their owners authority over a large body of 
employees. Moreover, it is questionable whether inheritance tax is 
the right instrument for resolving such an issue. 
Conversely, complete expropriation (even with compensation 
payments) would be difficult if not impossible to justify under 
the present terms of the German Basic Law. It would also lead to 
numerous complex concerns and further questions about imple-
mentation and realisation that would need to be settled. 
However, the problems presented above could at least be limited by 
the application of inheritance tax, if it led say to a partial sale of the 
company and the power of authority were consequently  divided. 
From this moral perspective a certain level of inheritance tax which 
would trigger at least the partial sale of any company should be 
evaluated positively. This applies in particular when  employees 
could be given opportunities to acquire company shares.
Favourable treatment of owner-occupied residential property
A tax-free transfer of owner-occupied residential property from 
parents to their children (currently 100% under the conditions of 
§13 No. 4c ErbStG42) strengthens inequality of wealth between 
property owners and persons without residential property. This 
is particularly true for valuable properties. In addition, the tax 
exemption of residential property gives a certain preference to 
certain assets. It seems simpler and fairer therefore to set a general 
personal tax allowance for children, which inter alia can then be 
used for residential property (see ch. Personal allowances). 
A (partial) change of ownership could also be good 
for new entrepreneurial input. There is no apparent 
evidence supporting an idea that the best alternative for 
continuing a business is always to pass it on exclusively 
to the next generation of the family. 
Conversely, complete expropriation (even with compen-
sation payments) would be difficult if not impossible to 
justify under the present terms of the German Basic Law. 
It would also lead to numerous complex concerns and 
further questions about implementation and realisation 




If homeownership is nevertheless to be comprehensively  favoured, 
as is currently the case, then a right to choose between the 
 general allowance and exemption for residential property should 
be  introduced. Double preferential treatment, as in the case of 
 current inheritance tax law, should be avoided in order to limit 
the untaxed transfer of large assets. Likewise, in our opinion there 
is no need for protection in the transfer of residential property 
which is above average in value. In current inheritance tax law, 
there is a size limit (200sqm living space according to §13 No. 4c 
EStG), but no value limit. In addition, there are legal possibilities 
to transfer non-leased properties in general tax free (Blank 2020: 
2179). These should be abolished.
Personal allowances
The level of personal allowances pursuant to §§16 and 17 ErbStG 
is justified in particular by observing constitutional requirements 
covering the rights to property and family protection, as discussed 
above. The current levels for children (400,000 euros) and grand-
children (200,000 euros) correspond approximately (and depen-
ding on the concept of wealth used43) to double or equivalent 
to the average wealth (arithmetic mean) of an adult in Germany 
(Shorrocks et al. 2019: 48), respectively. This means that well 
over 60% of all adults can probably transfer their assets to a child 
without having to pay inheritance tax (Shorrocks et al. 2019: 48). 
Hence, in our view these tax allowances appear beyond doubt 
to be compatible with the protection of marriage and family as 
set out in Article 6 of the Basic Law and also as required by the 
 German Constitutional Court in its judgement of 22 June 199544 
(see ch. General background). It is of course debatable as to whether 
or not the level of existing allowances could be reduced. How-
ever, at least the absolute allowance (400,000 euros for children 
and 200,000 euros for grandchildren) does not contribute to the 
tax-free transfer of extremely high assets. In principle, a regular 
and automatic adjustment to the development of average assets is 
considered sensible. Alternatively, tax allowances could be set in 
relation to the median at around 32,000 euros (Shorrocks et al. 
2019: 48), so that the distribution of wealth is better taken into 
account. 
In our view, the decisive factor in this context is that the per-
sonal allowances apply to all purchases by a person and can also 
be applied only once (in a lifetime). In addition, they must be 
offset against each other, so that in total it will never be possible 
to use tax allowances in excess of 400,000 euros. If, for example, 
a tax allowance of 20,000 euros (§16 (1) no. 5 ErbStG) has 
 already been “used up” by an acquisition from a third party, only 
a further tax allowance of 380,000 euros can be used in the case 
of a later acquisition, for instance from parents (and vice versa). 
This is intended to avoid multiple use of different tax allowances. 
At present, it is possible to use the respective tax allowances pur-
suant to §16 (1) ErbStG for acquisitions from different persons, 
which means that the different allowances can be cumulative. In 
addition, the tax allowances can be used again after 10 years have 
elapsed (§14 (1) ErbStG) for the same testator. As a result, it is 
possible to use tax allowances cumulatively several times using 
suitable tax planning in order to transfer large assets without a 
tax burden. 
A (non-economic) reason why (higher) inheritance taxes for 
wealth transfers within families are refused relates to the morality 
of parental partiality. It is considered a duty or virtue to exer-
cise partiality to one’s own children and hence to bequeath them 
 assets. The state should not intervene in this (critical discussion: 
Brighouse/Swift 2014: 123-148). Brighouse and Swift show that 
even without asset transfer, important (non-economic) goods can 
be transferred from parents to their children (Brighouse/Swift 
2014: 125). Moreover, they explain that gifts and inheritances 
are not especially crucial in maintaining a valuable bond between 
 parents and children, or at least that they could still do so if 
 heavily taxed (Halliday 2018: 8). Hence, a high taxation of (high) 
wealth seems justified.
These thoughts can also be found in constitutional law. As 
 explained above, this calls for a certain untaxed transfer of  assets 
to the children (protection of marriage and family), but also 
 applies high tax burdens on significant assets.
Tax rates
In addition to the overall base – in particular tax-free elements 
– tax rates comprise the essential element in determining the bur-
den of inheritance tax. Thus, they become decisive in designing an 
inheritance tax system that is fair. In combination with a tax-free 
allowance that does justice to the protection of the family, in our 
view top tax rates beyond 50% are also possible, provided that 
companies succeed in finding ways of continuing their business 
despite the high inheritance tax burden (see ch. Inheritance law 
and tax rate). If tax rates far beyond 50% were to be considered 
desirable, the restrictions imposed by Article 14 of the Basic Law 
(see ch. General information, Inheritance law and tax rate) must be 
clearly specified. 
The current tax rates, in accordance with §19 ErbStG, are in the 
form of a progressive graduated marginal rate tariff depending on 
the degree of kinship. Current tax rates range between 7% and 
50% depending on the value of taxable acquisition and degree 
of kinship. However, since tax liability can be severely restricted 
by tax planning, as explained above, particularly in the relation-
ship between (grand)parents and (grand)children, tax rates in the 
current inheritance tax system are not of great significance in the 
context of an overall view that is detached from the individual 
case. As a matter of principle, the tax rates should also be  adjusted 
to average assets or the distribution of assets (Piketty 2020: 1206). 
This could, for  example, be structured as follows:  
In addition to the overall base – in particular tax-free 
elements – tax rates comprise the essential element in 
determining the burden of inheritance tax. 
Up to the value of the taxpayer’s 
acquisition depending on the 
multiple of average assets 


















The progressive rate structure in conjunction with tax  allowances 
ensures that low and medium assets (compared with average 
 assets) are not taxed or subject to only light taxation and that high 
assets are taxed more heavily in line with their higher  performance. 
The choice of tax rates is a political and social issue. It essentially 
depends on the extent to which redistribution through  inheritance 
and gift tax is to be achieved, how much funding is needed to 
create equal opportunities and if necessary to what extent other 
taxes or social security contributions are to be reduced in return. 
Despite very high tax rates in percentage terms for large assets, 
such assets could still be transferred to the next generation in 
nominal terms. Thus, despite high tax rates, there would not be 
a total equalisation of wealth. However, the massive differences 
would be reduced or taken more into account in taxation. As with 
tax allowances, the median of wealth distribution (approximately 
32,000 euros) could be chosen as the basis for a rate curve instead 
of the average wealth.
If a less severe intervention in the unequal distribution of wealth 
through inheritance tax is desired, this could be achieved by 
 applying lower tax rates. In our view, though, a progressive rate 
depending on average assets is the best way to ensure that the 
ability-to-pay principle is properly taken into account and at least 
partially reduces the wealth inequality instead of establishing the 
inequality.45
Use of (additional) inheritance tax revenue
In addition to the amount and basis for assessing inheritance 
and gift tax, as already mentioned it is the use of (additional) 
tax income that is decisive in the effects of inheritance tax on 
generational justice. This is particularly improved if the funds are 
used to reduce inequality of distribution or to combat its nega-
tive symptoms. Of course, whilst inheritance tax plays its part, 
it is merely one instrument and hence cannot alone ensure this 
comprehensively. Moreover, if the funds are (additionally) made 
available to the general state budget, equality can be achieved only 
to a limited extent. There are many concrete possibilities which 
can be used. In particular, investments in education, health and 
infrastructure that specifically compensate for the disadvantages 
of poorer sections of the population appear to be sensible. In the 
tax field, additional revenue could be used to reduce the income 
tax on small and medium incomes. This could also be achieved, 
for example, by lowering VAT or consumption taxes, especially 
on non-luxury goods. Also conceivable would, for example, be: 
an exemption from real estate transfer tax for residential property 
up to a certain amount; a refund of VAT or consumption tax; 
subsidies/negative taxes for certain investments, homeownership, 
say; old-age provision; or the reduction of social security contri-
butions for small and medium incomes. In the entrepreneurial 
sector, especially in small businesses, increased special deprecia-
tion or subsidies to the employer’s social security contribution are 
possibilities for the use of funds. For reasons of intergenerational 
justice, repayment of the national debt, insofar as it is considered 
restrictive and negative, is also a possibility.
Piketty’s proposal dealing with a capital endowment for young 
people (2020: 1204) also seems worthy of discussion. Here the 
state would pay out a certain amount of money to everyone, for 
example at the age of 25. This would make a strong contribution 
to the diversification of property ownership and enable everyone 
to participate in the economy and society, at least up to a certain 
point, thereby significantly improving the current situation. 
Conclusion
Inheritances and gifts (transfer of assets to the next generation) 
that are not taxed, or are taxed at too low a rate, create or promote 
wealth inequality, respectively. Possible consequences are that 
this could be classified as unjust or undesirable against the back-
ground of intergenerational justice. This would be reduced by a 
higher inheritance and gift tax burden on capital transfers and 
a corresponding use of funds. The constitutional framework for 
achieving this has not yet been exhausted. A broader assessment of 
basis and tax rates depending on the distribution of wealth could 
lead to a taxation system that is more closely based on the abili-
ty-to-pay principle (derived from Article 3, Basic Law), since an 
enormous gain in performance at certain points would be taxed 
more heavily. In addition, a cross-subsidy could provide relief for 
lower income earners. It should be noted that a reduction in the 
unequal distribution of wealth would take greater account of the 
welfare state principle (Article 20 (1), Basic Law) than the current 
inheritance and gift tax. Despite the higher taxation especially of 
larger assets, a reformed inheritance tax system could also honour 
the constitutional right to property and thus inheritance (Article 
14, Basic Law) as well as the protection of marriage and family 
(Article 6, Basic Law).
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